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DELINQUENCY, PERSONAL COSTS AND PARENTAL TREATMENT: A TEST
OF A REWARD-COST MODEL OF JUVENILE CRIMINALITY*
IRVING M. PILIAVIN, ARLENE C. VADUM, AN JANE ALLYN H-RDYCK
Mr. Piliavin is Associate Professor in the University of Pennsylvania's School of Social Work. He
received the A.B. degree in 1951 and the M.S.W. in 1953 from the Universify of California (Berkeley).
He was awarded his doctorate in social work from Columbia University in 1961.
Miss Vadum presently is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of California (Berkeley) and a PostDoctoral Fellow at the Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania. She received the B.A. degree from McMaster University in 1963.
Mrs. Hardyck is serving as Assitant Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.
She formerly was on the staffs of the University of California (Berkeley) and Mills College, Oakland.
She received the B.A. degree from the University of Rochester in 1958, and in 1962 earned her Ph.D.
from Stanford University.
A questionnaire survey was carried out to test predictions from a reward-cost model of delinquency.
This model, in opposition to most current theories of delinquency, posits that everyone is instigated to
commit crime, some more often and more strongly than others, and that what deters those who conform are subjectively experienced high costs attendant upon criminal activity. In the present test of
the model, scales were constructed to measure boys' concern with two areas in which costs might be
incurred, parental approval and school involvement. The responses of 693 high school boys to the
scales indicated a strong relationship between costs and both self-reported and official measures of
delinquency. Implications of the findings both for the theory and for the control of delinquency are
discussed.
Several writers' have suggested recently that
the failure of current delinquency theories to
adequately account for male juvenile crime stems
from problematic features of a basic assumption
in virtually all of these theories, namely the
premise of a disposition toward crime. Whatever
their substantive differences, delinquency theories
have generally been fixed-disposition theories.
That is, the juvenile offender is seen as having
a certain enduring personal inclination toward
crime which is not experienced by so-called conforming boys and which results from some more
or less specific anomaly in his previous (sometimes current) life experience. Psychoanalytic
theory, frustration-aggression theory and the
currently fashionable delinquent subculture theory
* This research was partially supported by a research grant from the Fork Foundation and from
funds provided by an Institute of Social Sciences
Grant from the University of California, Berkeley.
With regard to the questionnaire referred to in the
above synopsis of this paper, see Briar & Piliavin,
Delinquency, Situational Inducements, and Commitwent to Conformity, 12 SoC. PROB. 35 (1965).
1BECEER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEvIANcE (1963); Briar and Piliavin, Delinquency,
Situational Inducements, and Commitment to Conformity, 12 SoC. PROB. 35 (1965); MATZA, DELINQUENCY
AND Dirr (1964).

are among the more well-known theories utilizing
2
this assumption.
Criticism of dispositional premises in delinquency theories has been based on several grounds.
First, few of the dispositions proposed have been
found to be consistently related to delinquent
behavior.3 Second, even those dispositions which
are found reliably to characterize juvenile offenders fail to account for one of the important
dynamics of so-called delinquent careers-that
most delinquents apparently become conforming
in early adulthood. 4 This suggests that whatever
dispositions operate to lead boys to commit crime,
they often decrease or become neutralized with
age. Yet, dispositional theories are either silent
on this change, or, having recognized it, fail to
explain it.
Third, currently posited criminal dispositions
fail to deal adequately with the repeated finding
2BERxowiTz, AGGRESSION: A SocIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1962); CLOWARD & OHLiN, DELINQUENCY
AND OPPORTUNITY (1960); COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS:
THE CULTURE or THE GANG (1955); FRIEDLANDER,
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(1947).
3

Schussler & Cressey, Personality Characteristicsof
Criminals,
55 Ami. J. Soc. 476 (1950).
4
BERxOWITZ, supranote 2; MATZA, supranote 1.
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that the vast majority of adolescent boys engage
in delinquency to some degree. 5 A number of
theories totally ignore this fact; others acknowledge it but then pass it off suggesting that the
unlawful behavior of most boys is not of the same
genus as that of "true" delinquents.8 Presumably
this assertion is based on the belief that "true"
delinquents commit more serious and more frequent crimes than other boys. But even granting
that some boys are more serious and persistent
law violators than others does not necessarily
imply different bases for crime within the two
groups. In the absence of supporting evidence
this assumption may be gratuitous and misleading.
Finally, on heuristic grounds, criticism has
been leveled at dispositional premises because
they direct attention away from situational
factors which may influence boys to commit
crime. It can be argued, of course, that such
influences are minor, but this argument contradicts what is known about human behavior in
general as well as what is known about delinquents and their crimes. As Matza has pointed
out,7 even the so-called serious delinquent engages in crime only rarely and his illegal actions
are typically purposive and situationally relevant.
Thus, if dispositions toward crime are in fact
operating, it seems likely that their behavioral
expression must in some sense be strongly influenced by situational elements.
Briar and Piliavin have recently argued that
a reward-cost formulation of the delinquent act
avoids the shortcomings of contemporary dispositional delinquency theories and provides a
means of conceptualizing delinquent acts in the
same terms as other forms of social behavior.
In its general form 9 a reward-cost model of social
action stresses the calculative and situational
elements involved in behavior. The Briar-Piliavin
specification of the model assumes that any
individual is capable of commiting criminal acts
and that the motives giving rise to these acts
5'Murphy, Shirley & Witmer, The Incidence of
Hidden Delinquency, 16 Am. J. ORTnOPSYCHIATRY 686
(1946).
6
CLOWAD & On-rnN, supra note 2.
7
MATZA, supra note 1.
8Briar & Piliavin, supra note 1.
9
HosANs, SocIAL BEiAvioR: ITS ELEENTARY
Fozms (1961); TiEBAUT & KELLEY, THE SocIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959); Becker, Notes on the
Concept of Commitment, 66 Am. J. Soc. 35 (1960);
Becker, PersonalChange in Adult Life, Socio EmTRY 40
(1964).
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are engendered by the individual's contemporary
situation. These motives, the satisfaction of which
may be viewed as rewards, include the reasons
offered by delinquents themselves for their illegal
acts; e.g., the desire for valued goods, the wish
to harm a hated other, the hope for acceptance
by peers, the wish for excitement, etc. 10 Whether
these motives are acted upon, however, is assumed
to be dependent upon not only the strength of
these motives but the individual's perception of
potential costs. Given a particular reward value
for an individual of a given act, the greater its
potential costs, the less likely it will be undertaken. While potential costs are probably numerous and varied, some of the more common
ones include the punishments that may be inflicted by officialdom, the wrath of God, parental
rejection, withdrawal of esteem by conventional
friends, and the loss of educational and vocational
opportunities3n
Finally, according to Briar and Piliavin, the
degree to which these possible rewards and costs
are experienced as such depends upon the circumstances of the actor. 2 The boy with money
in his pocket is not as likely as the boy without
funds to desire another person's funds. The boy
who is alienated from his parents and unconcerned
about their expectations is not as likely as the
boy who loves his parents either to consider their
disapproval as a potential cost for transgression
or to weigh this factor heavily in his decision of
whether or not to commit a crime.
Although Briar and Piliavin find their rewardcost model of delinquency to be more congruent
than other theories with the general trends and
patterns of juvenile crime, they provide no direct
tests of their thesis. The research being reported
here was intended to test one proposition of the
model, namely that the greater an individual's
potential costs in relation to the commission of a

10ROBINSON, JUvENmLE D LIQ Ncy: ITS NATURE
AND CONTROL (1960); YABLONSKY, THE VIOLENT
GANG (1962); Shaw, Juvenile Delinquency-A Group
Tradition, BuLL. STATE UNTv. or IOWA, No. 23, N.S.,
No. 700 (1933).
1 Although delinquency theories have not systematically incorporated the concept of costs, some have
discussed the role of superego and internalized conventional values in constraining criminal acts. These
concepts have not been very useful in delinquency
research however, and are, in any event, very narrow
specifications of the cost concept. At the least they fail
to encompass the more calculative concerns that are
involved in an actor's assessment of the consequences of
his actions.
2Briar & Piliavin, supra note 1.
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crime, the less the likelihood that he will engage
in crime.
Although the realms in which these costs might
be experienced are wide-ranging, for the purposes
of our research the measurement of potential
costs was limited to two areas, the family and
the school. Since these provide common and
long-term bases for conventional expectations
they suggest themselves as stable sources of potential costs for nonconformity among boys.
Sample
A 40-item questionnaire was sent to male
high school students living in a working class
community in the San Francisco Bay Area."
The subjects for the survey consisted of the 76
per cent of the original sample who responded
to the mail questionnaire. Of these 693 boys,
71 per cent were Caucasian and 29 per cent Negro.
The modal age of these students was 17 years.
Scales to Measure PotentialCosts
Three separate scales were constructed which
were intended to measure potential costs for
delinquency. By hypothesis, the higher an individual's score on any of these three scales,
the greater his potential costs for crime with
respect to the realm tapped by the scale.
(a) Father Costs Scale. The Father Costs
score for each boy was his mean score on six items
pertaining to his concern over his father's respect
and approval. Two examples of items included in
the Father Costs Scale were:
1. "I try to please my father" with seven response categories from "not at all" to "always."
2. "Being well thought of by my father" (1)
"doesn't matter at all to me" to (7) "means
everything to me."
(b) Mother Costs Scale. An identical scale
phrased in terms of his mother's respect and
approval formed the Mother Costs Scale and
scoring for this scale was the same as that for
Father Costs.
(c) School Costs Scale. The School Costs
score for each boy was his mean score for eight
items pertaining to his concern with teachers'
approval and his interest in and concern with
school performance. Two of the items used in
this scale were:
13 Copies of the questionnaire are available upon
request from the authors.

1. "In general, do you like or dislike school?"
with a three point response scale from "like
it" to "dislike it."
2. "Do you care what the teachers think of
you?" with three response alternatives
ranging from "I care a lot" to "I don't care
much."
For purposes of analysis, a respondent was
classified as having high, medium or low costs
on each of these scales depending upon whether
his score fell in the upper, middle or lower third
of the possible range of scores for that scale.
ParentalTreatment Scale
In addition to the costs scales, the questionnaire included two eight-item scales asking the
subject to indicate how well he was treated by his
parents. Two examples of the items contained
in the Father Treatment Scale are:
1. "In general, do you feel that you get a
'square deal' with your father?" with seven
response alternatives from "never" to "always.-)
2. "Do you think your father tries to understand your problems and worries?" with the
same response alternatives.
Eight identical items substituting "mother" for
"father" formed the Mother Treatment Scale.
As in categorizing boys' costs, parental treatment was designated as good, fair, or poor depending upon whether a given score was in the
upper, middle or lower third of the treatment
scale range. Father and mother scores were treated
separately.
The alpha reliabilities 4 and intercorrelations
of all five scales are presented in Table 1. As
may be seen from the table, the reliabilities for
the scales are adequate and range from .70 to
.89. Whereas the parental treatment and costs
scales appear to be somewhat related, the School
Costs Scale is relatively independent of the other
scales.
Criteriafor Delinquency
Data pertaining to the delinquency of sample
members were available from an independent
survey conducted several months prior to this
investigation.' 5 Three criteria were employed in
' 4Tryon, Reliability and Behavior Domain Validity:
Reformulation and Historical Critique,54 PsYcH. BuLL.
229 (1957).
" We wish to thank Alan B. Wilson and Travis
Hlrschi for making these data available to us.
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TABLE 1
REULAnBrrIES AND INTERCORRELATIONS Or TE THREE COSTS SCALES
PARENTAL TREATMENT SCALES (Total Sample; N = 693)

Father Costs ........................
Mother Costs ........................
School Costs .........................
Mother Treatment ....................
Father Treatment ....................
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AND

Father Costs
Scale

Mother Costs
Scale

School Costs
Scale

Father Treatment Scale

Mother Treatment Scale

.79

.57
77

.36
.22
80

.52
.18
.17
89

.25
.47
.15
.37
84*

* Diagonal = Alpha Reliabilities for each Scale (Tryon, note 13 infra.).

TABLE 2

RESULTS

PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL

Since the effect of costs varied by race the
results for Caucasian and Negro boys are presented separately.

Boys By Boys' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRANSGRES-

SIoNS-SCHOOL COSTS SCAE (CAucASIANs)
Delinquency Measures

Effect of Costs for Caucasians
School Costs

Police
Apprehension

Delinquent
Activity

Official Arrest

High .....
Medium..
Low ......

13.2 (144)
26.0 (196)
56.9 (130)

18.1 (144)
41.5 (195)
70.5 (132)

6.9 (144)
14.6 (198)
31.1 (132)

64.85
<.001

77.51
<.001

29.76
<.001

x2 ......
p .......

designating youth as delinquent. The first, the
Police Apprehension Index consisted of respondents' replies to one item asking whether or not
they had ever been picked up by the police for
an offense. The Delinquent Activity Index was
obtained by asking respondents to check which
of several acts from stealing objects worth less
than $2.00 to more serious offenses such as car
theft and assault they had committed within
the year preceding that survey. The final measure,
the Official Arrest Index, was obtained from the
official arrest records of sample members for
the three year period prior to the data collection.
A boy for whom one or more offenses was indicated
by any of these criteria was classified as a delinquent in terms of that criterion, data for the
three criteria being treated independently. x6
,6 The use of several criteria of delinquency in this
research and in delinquency research in general seems
advisable, given both the differential base rates afforded
by the three measures as well as the low intercorrelations among them.
The Pearson product-moment r's were:
Police Apprehension Index and Official
Arrest ndex .....................
r = .42
Police Apprehension Index and Delinquent Activity Index ...........
r = .38

The relationship between potential costs as
measured by the School Costs Scale and delinquency according to each of the three criteria
is presented in Table 2. From these data it can
be seen that as costs decrease from high to low,
the percentage of delinquents increases rather
dramatically.
On the Police Apprehension measure, for example, 13.2 per cent of the boys with high School
Costs indicate that they have been picked up by
the police one or more times; in the low cost
group the percentage of delinquents is 56.9 per
cent. This effect is consistent across all measures
of delinquency and the chi squares for all three
are significant at well beyond the .001 level.17
The results for Father Costs are presented
in Table 3. The data again reveal that on each
criterion of delinquency high cost boys commit
fewer delinquent acts than low cost boys. The
relationships are highly significant (p < .001 for
all measures) although the magnitude of the
effect for Father Costs is somewhat less pronounced than is the case for the School Costs
measure.
Official Arrest Index and Delinquent
Activity Index ...................
The base rates for delinquency were:

r = .26

Caucasians Negroes
Police Apprehension Index .......

31%

45%

Delinquent Activity Index ........
Official Arrest Index .............

42%
17%

45%
33%

17All p-values reported are two-tailed.
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The data of Table 4 present the results for
Mother Costs. While low cost boys are more
frequently delinquent than high or medium cost
boys on all of the criterion measures, only the
differences obtained on the Delinquent Activity
and Official Arrest indexes were significant (at
the .001 and .01 levels respectively).
Effect of Costsfor Negroes
Only the School Costs Scale yielded significant
relationships with delinquency for Negro boys.
As may be seen in Table 5 the predicted relationship between School Costs and delinquency
among Negro boys replicates the results obtained
on the Caucasian subjects, although the relationship is of a lower order of significance among the
Negroes. The Father Costs and Mother Costs
Scales, as presented in Tables 6 and 7, reveal
nonsignificant effects in all analyses for the three
measures of delinquency. In addition, contrary
to hypothesis, the data for Mother Costs indicate
a slight tendency for high costs to be associated
with more delinquency on both the Police ApTABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL
BOYS BY BOYS' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRANSGP ES-

sIoNs-FAnER COSTS ScAE (CAUcASIANS)

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL
BOYS BY Boys' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRANsGREs-

sioNs-ScHooL CosTS SCALE (NEGROES)

Delinquency Measures
School Costs

High ......
Medium...
Low.......
x2 .......

p .......

Police

Delinquent

Apprehension

Activity

Official Arrest

27.3 (33)
38.5 (96)
62.5 (64)

18.2 (33)
42.3 (97)
61.9 (63)

12.1 (33)
32.7 (98)
43.3 (67)

13.74
<.01

17.17
<.(001

9.74
<.01

TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL

Boys BY Boys' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRAUsGRtssiONs-FATHER COSTS SCALE (NEGROES)

Delinquency Measures
Father Costs

High ......
Medium...
Low .......
x2 ......
p.......

Police
Apprehension

Delinquent
Activity

41.1 (56)
43.2 (51)
47.5 (61)

43.9 (57)
42.0 (50)
46.8 (62)

32.8 (61)
30.9 (55)
30.8 (65)

.27
n.s.

.07
n.s.

. 52
n.s.

Official Arrest

Delinquency Measures
Father Costs

Police
Apprehension

Delinquent
Activity

Ofcial Arest

High .....
Medium..
Low ......

26.6 (214)
22.3 (157)
54.4 (90)

33.6 (214)
47.8 (157)
56.0 (91)

14.1 (220)
13.6 (162)
29.5 (95)

TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL
Boys BY Boys' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRANSGRESsiONs-MoTHER CosTs SCALE (NEGROES)

Delinquency Measures
Mother Costs

15.43
<.001

X2 ...... 30.79
p ....... <.001

13.15
<.001

Police

High ...... 51.3 (76)
Medium... 42.9 (49)
Low ....... 37.5 (32)

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMONG HIGH SCHOOL
Boys BY Boys' POTENTIAL COSTS FOR TRAxsGREsSIONs-MOTHER COSTS SCALE (CAucASIANS)

Delinquent

X2.......
p ........

1.99
n.s.

Official Arrest

Activity

Apprehension

44.0 (75)
38.8 (49)
57.6 (33)
2.90
n.s.

40.7 (81)
23.5 (51)
26.5 (34)
4.94
<. 10

Delinquency Measures
Mother Costs

Police
Apprehension

Delinquent
Activity

Official Arrest

High ......
Medium...
Low .......

29.0 (138)
30.6 (144)
38.5 (122)

31.2 (138)
41.0 (144)
57.4 (122)

16.3 (141)
10.1 (148)
25.2 (127)

18.44
<. 001

11.12
<. 01

prehension and Official Arrest Indexes. This
failure to find the relationship expected between
delinquency and parental cost scale scores for
Negroes will be taken up in some detail below.
Effect of ParentalTreatment

x2 .......
p .......

3.05
n.s.

Although the results presented thus far dearly
confirm the hypothesis under investigation for
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TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCY AMIONG HIGH AND Low COST Boys REPORTING ADEQUATE OR Poop1 FATHER
TREATMENT (TOTAL S pa)

Delinquency Measures
Police Apprehension
Costs

Father Treatment

2

Delinquent Activity
Father Treatment
x

x , Father

Adequate

Poor

High

21.1
(199)

19.5
(41)

Low

49.4
(81)

55.8
(120)

22.23
<.001

16.20
<.001

Costs

Treatment

Adequate

Poor

0.00*
n.s.

24.6
(199)

40.0
(40)

0.81
n.s.

56.9
(79)

63.4
(123)

26.43
<.001

6.78
<.01

Official Arrest

2,

Father Treatment
Father _

Treatment

2

, Father
Treatment

Adequate

Poor

3.98
<.05

13.0
(200)

9.8
(41)

0.10*
n.s.

0.84
n.s.

28.1
(82)

33.9
(124)

0.78
n.s.

9.17
<.01

8.91
<.01

* ) corrected for continuity.

Caucasians and at least partially for Negroes,
the objection can be raised that these findings
are spurious and indicate only the workings of
other factors that influence costs and delinquency
in the same direction. While it was not possible
to examine the validity of this objection over a
wide range of potential explanatory variables,
the effect of one factor, parental treatment of
children, was investigated. It has been long and
widely assumed by students of delinquency that
parental rejection and neglect are important
factors in the making of delinquents. Furthermore, it can be argued plausibly that such practices can lead children to become alienated from
parents and unconcerned about their expectations.
Perhaps then the relationships obtained merely
reflect this direct influence of parental practices
on both costs and delinquent behavior.
The analysis dealing with this question was
confined to sample members who could be categorized as having either high or low total costs
based on a composite of their scores on the Father
and School Cost Scales. 18 Boys who were initially
classified as having high costs on one of these
scales and no lower than medium costs on the
other were placed into a High Total Cost grouping. Conversely sample members who were initially classified as having low costs on one of these
scales and no higher than medium costs on the
other were assigned to a Low Total Cost category.
IsAlthough Mother Costs were related to delinquency, this scale was the least powerful of the costs
scales and had higher variance than the other measures.
Consequently, it was not employed in developing a total
cost index.

Father Treatment scores were used as the
index of parental practices since only Father Costs
had been employed in the Total Costs index.
Because of low cell frequencies, fair and good
fathers were combined into a category of adequate fathers.
Chi-square analyses of the relationship between Father Treatment and delinquency revealed a strong tendency for adequate father
treatment groups to manifest less delinquent
behavior (p < .001 on all criteria of delinquency).
When this effect is examined separately for Caucasians the same relationship is evident (p < .001
on Police Contact; p < .001 on Recency; p < .05
on Official Index). Although the results are generally in the predicted direction for Negroes,
the data do not reach acceptable levels of significance on any of the three criteria for delinquency.
In Table 8 the results are presented for our
total sample for the bivariate analysis of Total
Costs and Father Treatment on delinquency.
When the relationship between parental practices
and delinquency is examined holding costs constant, only one of the six possible comparisons
is significant. On the other hand, when fathers'
parental practices are controlled and the resulting
relationships between costs and delinquency are
observed, all of the six possible comparisons show
significant differences. When this relationship
was examined for Caucasians (Table 9), the data
again reveal that the effect of costs is stronger
than that of parental practices. These analyses
support our hypothesis that delinquency is more
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TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE OF DELINQUENCy AMONG HIGH Aim Low CosT Boys REPORTING
ADEQUATE AND POOR FATHER TREATMENT (CAUCASIANS)

Delinquency Measures

Costs

Father Treatment

Official Arrest

Delinquent Activity

Police Apprehension

Father Treatment

2

Father Treatment

,

x2, Father
Treatment

x1 Father
Treatment

x , Father
Treatment

Adequate

Poor

Adequate

Poor

Adequate

Poor

19.9

19.4

0.01*

23.5

5.13

10.8

6.4

(166)

(31)

n.s.

(166)

(30)

<.05

(167)

(31)

Low

47.5
(59)

58.3
(72)

1.54
n.s.

60.3
(58)

70.3
(74)

1.43
n.s.

23.73
(59)

36.5
(74)

;e,

16.75

13.23

26.39

6.61

6.02

8.50*

Costs

<.001

<.001

<.001

<.02

<.02

<.01

High

*2

43.3

t
2.51
n.s.

corrected for continuity.

t xA not calculated due to expected frequencies less than 5.
the direct consequence of costs than of parental
treatment.
Since our expectations concerning the effects
of parental costs and treatment were not confirmed for Negroes and because of small cell
frequencies in the relevant table, the relationship
between parental treatment, total costs and
delinquency was not assessed for this group.

financial gain. The findings of this study, presented in detail elsewhere,2 are consistent with
those obtained in the survey reported above.
Boys with low potential costs cheated significantly more often on the test than boys with high
potential costs. These results, furthermore, remain
even when prior delinquency is controlled.

AN EXPERI ENTAL ANALOG

To review briefly, the hypothesis under investigation was that boys are constrained from commiting transgressions by the degree to which
these transgressions pose potential costs in various
spheres of the boys' lives. Three scales designed
to measure potential costs were used to test this
hypothesis. Two of these scales measured costs
in terms of concern for parental approval, and
the third in terms of concern for teacher approval
and acceptable school performance. All cost
measures were strongly related to the occurrence
of delinquency among Caucasians. On the other
hand, while the School Cost Scale predicted
delinquency among Negroes, the Parental Cost
Scales did not.
Given the overall findings, it is difficult to view
this unanticipated failure as a refutation of the
relevance of personal costs to delinquent behavior. On the other hand, it cannot simply be
dismissed as a consequence of the unreliability
of responses by Negroes to the two scales (Alpha

The survey results, at least for Caucasians,
clearly support the stated hypothesis. However,
the findings remain ambiguous because of possible
biases in the criterion measures. For example the
findings that boys with low costs are more often
arrested by police may not reflect more delinquency on their part but rather that they are
dealt with more harshly for their crimes because
they are less likely than high cost boys to evince
attitudes and emotions which evoke police leniency.19 In addition, the measures of self-reported
crime and police apprehension may reflect only
that low cost boys are less likely to hide their
transgressions than are high cost boys.
In order to avoid these problems as well as to
provide an opportunity for studying the effects
of costs on delinquent and nondelinquent boys
under controlled reward conditions, an experiment
was designed in which direct observations could
be made on the occurrence of a quasi-delinquent
act, namely cheating on a test for purposes of
9 Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters With J"veniles, 70, Am. J. Soc. 206 (1964).
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20 Piliavin, Hardyck & Vadum, ConstrainingEffects
of Personal Costs on the Transgressions of Juveniles,
10 J. PEas. & Soc. Psycn. 227 (1968).
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Reliability = .76 for Father Costs Scale, .74 for
Mother Costs Scale). One possible explanation for
this finding is that while virtually all white parents severely condemn and punish delinquency
among their children, a large number of Negro
parents tolerate it. The presence of such tolerance
in families where children desire parental approval
would serve to lower the potential costs of crime
for these children and increase the probability of
its occurrence.
But why should some Negro parents be more
tolerant or resigned to their children's delinquencies? A partial answer to this query is found
in the results of studies by Lewis l and Rainwater.Y
These investigators report that many Negro
parents adhere to the presumably erroneous
assumptionul that the deviant norms of street
life eventually and inevitably prevail among
children over the conventional expectations of
parents. As a result, say Lewis and Rainwater,
these parents give up trying to counter street
mores as their children move into adolescence.
Although Lewis and Rainwater do not specifically
connect this abdication of the parental authority
role with tolerance of crime, the relationship
seems not at all unlikely. But even if it is true
that many Negro parents are somehow tolerant
of juvenile crime it still needs to be shown that
21
Lewis, Child Rearing Among Low:Income Families,
in FERMAN, KORNBLAH
AMERIcA 342-53 (1965).
22

&

HABER,

POVERTY

IN

Rainwater, The Concept of Identity in Race Rela-

tions: Notes and Queries, 2 DAEDALUS 172 (1966).

2Reckless,
Dinitz & Murray, The "Good" Boy in a
High Delinquency Area, 48 J. CRmr. L.C. & P.S. 18
(1957).
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this tolerance is found in families where children
desire parental approval and that it increases
the likelihood that these children will engage in
delinquency. Unfortunately, we know of no data
bearing on these matters. They remain unknowns
requiring empirical study.
Another avenue for further investigation concerns the role of personal costs as an intervening
variable between delinquency and the social
and interpersonal conditions which have been
found to be related to juvenile crime. Students
of delinquency have suggested that these various
conditions are the bases for the crime-producing
dispositions posited by contemporary delinquency
theories. A reward-cost formulation of delinquency would see these conditions as leading to
lowered personal costs in relation to crime. Support
for this latter view is provided by the analysis
reported here linking fathers' treatment of boys,
costs, and delinquency. Obviously, additional
analyses using other correlates of juvenile crime
are needed before the general applicability of the
proposition can be granted.
Aside from its theoretical relevance, a rewardcost formulation of delinquency has some interesting practical implications for the control of juvenile
crime. It suggests that this control might be
achieved through increasing the costs of delinquency and the rewards of conformity. The most
direct way of doing this requires the use of money
wages to boys merely on condition that they keep
out of trouble. A delinquency control program
based on this simple approach would provide an
important test of the reward-cost framework.

